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Abstract
Cost of time passing plays an important role when investigate the collective
behaviour in real world. Each rational individual can get a more reasonable
strategy by comprehensively considering the time cost. Motivated by the fact,
we here propose a mechanism with individual time cost heterogeneity whose
core lies in two aspects: 1. The individuals in the rule network are divided
into 2 groups: high-time cost and low-time cost. 2. Each individual is endowed
with a time cost parameter, and the individuals take into account the effect of
time cost on the benefit when they interact with a neighbour. The synchronous
updating algorithm is used to study the evolution of cooperation with time
cost on a regular lattice. Simulation results show that the proposed mechanism
effectively promotes cooperation in the snowdrift game. Moreover, it is revealed
that the following reasons lead to a higher level of cooperation: The higher
time cost, the more individuals of high-time cost in the group, and the more
differences of time cost between groups when low-time cost remains unchanged.
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1. Introduction
Cooperation is the general trend in human society and biome. Research on
cooperative behavior has become a hot spot in academic research [1, 2, 3]. And
for studying this issue, evolutionary game theory provides a useful theoretical
framework which can resolve the contradiction between cooperation and selfless
[4]. The evolutionary game was developed by mathematician Von Neumann and
economist Morgan Stern in 1944, and has formed many classic frameworks now.
For example, snowdrift game, prisoner’s dilemma game, public goods game, deer
hunting game, etc [5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10].
Early in 2006, Novak proposed that cooperative behaviors should be sup-
ported by corresponding mechanisms before they can appear, and introduced
five mechanisms [11] to promote cooperation: Kinship selection, direct reci-
procity, indirect reciprocity, network reciprocity and group selection. The core
idea of kinship selection is to explain the cooperative behavior that occurs be-
tween individuals with kinship or closer relationships, the derived mechanism is:
Hanmilotons rule [12] (the condition for altruistic behavior is r > c/b, where r
is the probability of having the same gene, and c/b is the cost-benefit-ratio. For
example, r = 1/2 between brothers, cousins between r = 1/8), the herd mecha-
nism (individuals will choose the strategy that their neighbors choose the most
to change themselves). Direct reciprocity [13] is the interaction that the two
sides of the game will repeat many times. If this side chooses cooperation this
round, then the probability of the other party choosing cooperation will be very
high for the next round. There are mechanisms derived from this idea: Tit-For-
Tat (TFT) rule [14, 15], which completely imitates the other party’s previous
selection. Win-Stay, Lost-Shift (WSLS) rules [16, 17]. In this rule, if this round
of selection gains high returns, the next round will keep the strategy, whereas
the subsequent round will make the opposite choice. Indirect reciprocity [18]
arises from the complex relationship of human society. The interaction between
individuals and individual views is limited, and more interaction with strangers,
so it can also be explained that indirect reciprocity is based on direct reciprocity.
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Mechanisms derived from indirect reciprocity, such as, reward and punishment
mechanism [19, 20, 21, 22, 23]. Its basic idea is to reward cooperator and pun-
ish defectors. Both rewards and punishments can promote cooperation, but the
research of various scholars and studies tells us that punishments can promote
cooperation more than rewards. In the real world, an individual will not inter-
act with all individuals, but only with a few individuals, and such an interactive
relationship constitutes a network structure [24, 25, 26]. Therefore, many schol-
ars have also focused on the network structure: The first evolutionary game
proposed by Novak on the regular network [27], and then the research on the
evolutionary game on the small-world network and the scale-free network has
also become a hot spot for scholars [28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36]. In ad-
dition to these 5 types of mechanisms, some scholars have found that adding
memory mechanism [37, 38, 39] can also promote cooperation. The idea of the
memory mechanism is that the individual can refer to the strategies of the pre-
vious rounds and choose the strategy in the round with the highest benefit for
him to play this round of the game. Some scholars have proposed adding some
parameters, such as the heterogeneity of learning ability [40].
In 2019, some scholars suggested that time cost in the snowdrift game can
also promote the level of cooperation [41]. They assume that two drivers are
stuck on the road. If one chooses to cooperate and the other chooses to defect,
the defector doesn’t seen to lose anything, but the passing of time can also cause
losses to the defector. But the article has certain limitations. We find that few
studies focus on the influence of groups type of the evolution of cooperation in
network games. From this perspective, we propose a method for the effect of
individual time cost heterogeneity(ITCH) mechanism on the level of cooperation
in the snowdrift game. We mainly study the snowdrift game model, in addition
to the originally considered snow shoveling cost, a new time cost parameter
tcosttime is added. Secondly, the whole group is divided into A(high-time cost)
and B(low-time cost), that is to say, the time cost considered by A and B is
different. Because, in human society, the importance of time for people with
different identities is different, so the time cost for diverse groups of people
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due to the passing of time is also different. Considering these, we introduce a
parameter tcosttime that is the value of time cost which is represents the time cost
of each individual caused by the passage of time. And introduce a parameter V
to represent the percentage of A group in the whole group. In order to better
reflect the impact of differences between groups on the level of cooperation, we
also introduces a parameter α for research. Simulation results show that the
proposed mechanism effectively promotes cooperation in the snowdrift game.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we introduce a
model of ITCH mechanism. In Section 3, we show the simulation results and
analyze it. In Section 4, we give the conclusion of this article.
Figure 1: For the case of V=0.5, α=2, with different tcosttime, the graph showing the fraction
of cooperators F with the change of cost-to-benefit ratio of snow shoveling r, where tL =
0, 0.1, 0.15, 0.2, 0.25, 0.3, tH = 0, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6. When tL = 0, tH = 0, it is the traditional
snowdrift game. The larger the tcosttime value, the higher the level of cooperation.
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Figure 2: For the case of tL = 0.25, tH = 0.5, α=2, with different V , the graph showing the
fraction of cooperators F with the change of cost-to-benefit ratio of snow shoveling r, where
V = 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8. The larger the V value, the higher the level of cooperation.
2. Model
The individuals in the network are divided into 2 groups, A (high-time cost)
and B (low-time cost). Individual A and individual B production is defined by
the parameters V and (1−V ), where V represents the percentage of individual
A in the total population. In the traditional snowdrift game, the calculation of
revenue is:
C D
C b− c2 b− c
D b 0
(1)
Among them, T > R > S > P , and 2R = T + S. According to the
parameterization method, we transform the matrix into another more suitable
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Figure 3: For the case of tL = 0.1, tH = 0.2, V=0.5, with different V , the graph showing the
fraction of cooperators F with the change of cost-to-benefit ratio of snow shoveling r, where
α = 2, 3, 4, 5, 6. The larger the α value, the higher the level of cooperation.
form.
C D
C 1 1− r
D 1 + r 0
(2)
Among them. T = 1 + r, R = 1, P = 0, S = 1 − r, and r = c(2b−c) = c2 ,
r ∈ (0, 1) represents the cost benefit ratio of mutual cooperation.
When one side chooses to cooperate and the other side chooses to defect, the
defector seen to have no cost, but as time goes by, the defector will also incur
time cost. So define a parameter tcosttime to represent time cost. In a situation
where one chooses to cooperate and the other chooses to defect, the defectors
benefit will become:
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(a) r=0.2. (b) r=0.4.
(d) r=0.6. (e) r=0.8.
Figure 4: When r=0.8, α=2 and V=0.5, time evolution of the proportion of cooperators F
on square lattices for different tcosttime.
W = 1 + r − 2rtcosttime (3)
In this formula, the defector’s benefit minus the time cost, and tcosttime repre-
sents the proportion of time cost in the cost c = 2r. Different individuals have
different sensitivities to the passage of time, so the benefit of the category A
group in the above situation is:
W1 = 1 + r − 2rtH (4)
The benefit of the category B group in the above situation is:
W2 = 1 + r − 2rtL (5)
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And tH = αtL(α is the differences of time cost coefficient between high-time
cost and low-time cost)
Each point on the grid represents an individual x, and the probability of
each individual choosing cooperation or defection strategy in the first round is
50%. 4 dots around x represents its 4 neighbors y, y ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. In each
round of the game, the individual x chooses the appropriate strategy C or D
to play with its neighbors, and at the same time it’s neighbors also choose the
appropriate strategy C or D. In the model, this game is repeated four times
among individuals who are not repeated among four neighbors. Then the four
benefits obtained by individual x are accumulated. In summary, the cumulative
benefit obtained by individual x in round t is as follows:
Ut,x =
∑
Ut,x,y (6)
For better simulation, we use the Fermi update formula to update the strat-
egy of individual x, the formula is as follows:
W (Sx ← Sy) = 1
1 + exp[−(Ut,x − Ut,y)/K] (7)
In the formula, t indicates round parameter, K(0 < K <∞) is under the update
rule of the noise parameter, the individual x maintains its original strategy with
a probability of 1−W . The parameter K →∞, indicates that all individuals are
not affected by the neighbor’s benefit, and the decision is completely taken in a
random way. In this case, even if the benefit of the individual x is greater than
the neighbor y, the individual will still change the strategy, which will make the
benefit lower. When K → 0, it means that the individual is completely rational.
As long as Ut,x > Ut,y is satisfied, the individual x’s strategy is replaced by the
strategy of its neighbor y. Depending on the above description, we choose
K = 0.1. The simulation starts in a random state and iterates continuously
until the simulation results are stable.
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(a) r=0.2. (b) r=0.4.
(d) r=0.6. (e) r=0.8.
Figure 5: When r=0.8, α=2 and tL = 0.25, tH = 0.5, time evolution of the proportion of
cooperators F on square lattices for different V .
3. Simulation and discussion
The simulation process is performed on a regular grid with L × L vertices.
Each player is connected to his four nearest neighbors. The initial cooperative
probability of each individual is set as 0.5, the size of the regular grid is N =
L × L = 100 × 100 = 10000. The average frequency of cooperative acts is
quantified as the cooperation level F, where F is obtained by counting the ratio
of the number of cooperators in the whole population after the system reaches
a relatively steady state, that is, the F is gained by averaging 103 rounds after
a transient of 104 rounds. In order to assure suitable accuracy, each point in
simulation figures is averaged 20 interdependent realizations.
In our simulation, the following fact is observed: As shown in Fig. 1, we
can see that the mixed strategy cannot maintain a high level of cooperation in
the case of tL = 0, tH = 0 (that is, the traditional Fermi learning process), the
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(a) r=0.2. (b) r=0.4.
(d) r=0.6. (e) r=0.8.
Figure 6: When r=0.8, V=0.5 and tL = 0.1, tH = 0.2, time evolution of the proportion of
cooperators F on square lattices for different α.
system quickly turns into complete defect in the process of increasing r. How-
ever, in the case of tL 6= 0, tH 6= 0 (that is, considering the learning process with
ITCH mechanism), the number of defectors can be greatly reduced and the level
of cooperation can be significantly improved. For different time cost tcosttime,
the cooperation level of the system increases as the increasing of tcosttime value.
When tL = 0.1, tH = 0.2, players have few cost time, then the impact on the co-
operation level is small. However, compared with tL = 0, tH = 0, the threshold
value of r increases a lot, and when r is about 0.78, the system is completely
betrayed. Moreover, the larger tL and tH can enhance cooperation further.
Then, we also pay attention to the situation that the cooperators’ fraction F
changes with cost-to-benefit ratio of snow shoveling r at several different V (as
shown in Fig. 2). The value of F increases when V continue to increase. This
is because V controls the benefit of group, the higher the V value is, the more
time cost is and the more it will take for player to pay for their cost, the more
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their will choose cooperate. At the same time scale, players who continue to
adopt the defect strategy will gain very few payoffs, only players who continue
to adopt cooperative strategies can consistently maintain high payoffs, which
successfully reduces large-scale defect and improves the level of cooperation.
Therefore, the higher the V value, the higher the level of cooperation.
We have also studied the effect of the α value on the cooperation level at
different payoff. α represents the time cost difference between the low-time cost
individuals and the high-time cost individuals in the model when low-time cost
unchanged. As shown in Fig. 3 that for a small r(0 < r < 0.3), F remains
at a high level. Then r gradually increases, the smaller α is, the faster the
cooperator will disappear.
In order to further verify the obtained results, the numerical simulations of
time courses that describe the relation between F and time steps are shown in
Figs. 4-6.
It is found from Fig. 4 that for a small r=0.2, 0.4, F increases sharply.
After a transitory period, F arrives at a relatively stable state. Obviously, the
F for tL = 0.1, 0.15, 0.2, 0.25, 0.3, tH = 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6 is higher than that
for tL = 0, tH = 0. For an intermediate r=0.6, the F for tL,tH=0, 0.1, 0.15
decreases dramatically, while that for tL,tH = 0.2, 0.25, 0.3 surges. When the r
is larger(r=0.8), the F values in the considered model still keep an upward trend
with a fast speed for tL = 0.3, tH = 0.6 and a slight speed for tL = 0.25, tH = 0.5.
Then, we observe the effects of cooperation in population proportion V . For
the r=0.2, 0.4, 0.6, F increases significantly for all V . When further increasing
r (r=0.8), the F value for V=0.6, 0.8 continually remains a high ratio, while
that for V=0.2, 0.4, shows a downward trend.
Finally, let us notice the impacts of evolution of cooperation in α value. For
the r=0.2, 0.4, F increases significantly for all α. However, for a large r=0.8,
the F for α=2, 3, 4, 5 deceases quickly, but α=6 decrease slowly, then gradually
rise to a level.
From the above descriptions, it is seen that in the three mentioned situa-
tions, whether the cost-to-benefit ratio of snow shoveling r is small, intermediate
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(a) tL = 0, tH = 0, t = 1. (b) tL = 0, tH = 0, t = 10. (c) tL = 0, tH = 0, t = 50.
(d) tL = 0.15, tH = 0.3, t =
1.
(e) tL = 0.15, tH = 0.3, t =
10.
(f) tL = 0.15, tH = 0.3, t =
500.
(g) tL = 0.3, tH = 0.6, t = 1. (h) tL = 0.3, tH = 0.6, t =
10.
(i) tL = 0.3, tH = 0.6, t =
500.
Figure 7: A snapshot diagram of the characteristics of cooperators (yellow) and defectors
(blue) at different tcosttime and time steps. The time cost from top to bottom are tL =
0, tH = 0, tL = 0.15, tH = 0.3 and tL = 0.3, tH = 0.6. The results are obtained by setting r=
0.8, α=2 and V= 0.5.
or large, the F can be enhanced by the ITCH mechanism compared to the tra-
ditional model. On the other hand, to further understand the reason of above
phenomena, we next scrutinize the microscopic evolutionary process in Figs.
7-9.
One can see from Fig. 7 that we choose a large r=0.8, when the tL =
0.3, tH = 0.6, the cooperators can survive by forming the compact clusters to
avoid being exploited by the defectors, which will isolate the defectors little by
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(a) V = 0.2, t = 1. (b) V = 0.2, t = 10. (c) V = 0.2, t = 100.
(d) V = 0.6, t = 1. (e) V = 0.6, t = 10. (f) V = 0.6, t = 100.
(g) V = 0.8, t = 1. (h) V = 0.8, t = 10. (i) V = 0.8, t = 10000.
Figure 8: A snapshot diagram of the characteristics of cooperators (yellow) and defectors
(blue) at different V and time steps. The time cost from top to bottom are V = 0.2, V =
0.6and V = 0.8. The results are obtained by setting r=0.8, α=2 and tL = 0.25, tH = 0.5.
little from the whole population. Although some patches of defectors appear in
the evolutionary process, this does not prevent the extinction of them.
Similar results also appear in Fig. 8 Especially, for the large V=0.8, coop-
erators form the clusters faster to protect themselves against invasion. As a
result, the defectors vanish in the lattice.
Analogous phenomenon is also discovered in Fig. 9 Nevertheless, when r is
larger, the situation becomes much harsher in a small α. A number of players
are attracted by the temptation to defect and defectors win the evolutionary
race.
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By analyzing the evolutionary process of cooperators and defectors on a
square lattice for different r, we elucidate the reason why the ITCH strategy
can promote cooperation in the structured population to some extent.
(a) α = 2, t = 1. (b) α = 2, t = 50. (c) α = 2, t = 100.
(d) α = 4, t = 1. (e) α = 4, t = 50. (f) α = 4, t = 100.
(g) α = 6, t = 1. (h) α = 6, t = 50. (i) α = 6, t = 100.
Figure 9: A snapshot diagram of the characteristics of cooperators (yellow) and defectors
(blue) at different V and time steps. The time cost from top to bottom are α=2, α=4 and
α=6. The results are obtained by setting r= 0.8, V=0.5 and tL = 0.25, tH = 0.5.
4. Conclusions
We have intensively explored how the mechanism of ITCH affects coopera-
tion on the regular network. And we discuss the effect of different time cost,
proportions of the two groups and the time cost difference on the level of coop-
eration in the model.
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As for the evolution, each player interacts with its nearest four neighbours.
The time cost plays a crucial part in the evolution of cooperation. It is found
that when time cost increases gradually, the cooperation level always increases.
And the level of cooperation is also affected by the proportion of the two groups,
the simulation shows that the bigger proportion of high-time cost individual in
the group leads to a higher level of cooperation. In addition, we discover if
low-time cost remains unchanged, the greater time cost difference, the higher
level of cooperation.
In conclusion, the mechanism of ITCH promotes cooperation.
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